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Abstract 
 
 
Traditionally, ‘René Descartes’ is synonymous with ‘method.’ The so-called father of modern science, he is 
perhaps the systematic and methodological philosopher par excellence, a fundamental motivation for his 
attempt to secede from contemporary thought being the possibility of establishing a universally valid 
method in the search for truth. In a passage in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes contrasts 
his method with what he calls scholastic “[r]iddles,” verbal equivocations that hinder the acquisition of 
knowledge. In this paper I analyze this notion of riddling and the Cartesian method to posit that, finally, 
Descartes cannot avoid replicating the very riddles he criticizes, that his ‘revolutionary’ method only 
generates more riddles to be methodically solved. In short, Descartes’ method is dependent upon words but 
also calls for the effacement of the very words that constitute it. Words are both a methodological necessity 
and limitation; a double bind, there is no method without words, but, at the same time, there can be no 
method with words, that is, no methodo-logos. In its broadest formulation, Descartes must always at once 
say too much and too little.  
 
 
 
 
To speak of ‘René Descartes’ has always been to speak of ‘method.’ The so-called 
father of modern science, he is perhaps the systematic and methodological philosopher 
par excellence. Of course, ‘method’ is not entirely univocal throughout Descartes. As 
Janet Broughton argues, for instance, the “method of universal doubt”1 that Descartes 
employs in the Meditations is “a distinctive method” from, say, “the general method of 
discovery” expounded in the Rules or “the general method” described in the 
Discourse.2 Even if these methods vary, however, they are united by the common 
denominator of Descartes’ notion of deduction, which opens the possibility of 
establishing a universally valid method in the search for truth (“innate principles,” 
Descartes calls them).3 Words, we will see, are fundamental to this project. But 
however essential words might prove for Descartes’ deduction, they simultaneously 
place limitations on it and even circumvent the acquisition of knowledge according to  
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Descartes’ own rigorous criteria. In short, Descartes’ method depends upon words but 
also calls for the effacement of the very words that constitute it. Words are both a 
methodological necessity and limitation; a double bind, there is no method without 
words, but, at the same time, there can be no method with words, that is, no method-of-
logos.  
 
Descartes himself acknowledges a number of problems that the use of words entails. In 
his Rules, he goes so far as to claim that “in the vast majority of issues about which the 
learned dispute, the problem is almost always one of words,” and if “philosophers always 
agreed about the meanings of words, their controversies would almost all be at an end.”4 
Shortly thereafter, Descartes calls a certain class of these disputes (somewhat scathingly) 
“[r]iddles,” that is, problems where “the difficulty lies in the obscurity of the language 
employed.”5 Such riddles are to be replaced by the disambiguated and immaterial signs 
that Descartes requires for the deductions necessary for maximizing human knowledge, 
but, in what follows, a closer look at both riddles and the Cartesian method will reveal 
that, according to his own comments on words, Descartes must replicate the very riddles 
he criticizes. In its broadest formulation, Descartes must always at once say too much and 
too little. 
 
Now, on one hand, reading riddles answers to the rules Descartes himself establishes; the 
critique is therefore immanent to Descartes. On the other hand, the critique is applicable 
to a number of methods in general, perhaps to methodology in general. However, it must 
be stressed that the generality of the critique becomes legible only after Descartes, in at 
least three senses: chronologically after the event of Descartes, after the manner of 
Descartes, and after Cartesian ends of certainty. In other words, the general applicability 
of the critique cannot be ascertained outside the specificity of Descartes and the 
philosophical modernity that he inaugurates. Following Foucault’s archaeology, for 
instance, the first radical discontinuity with the era of “resemblance”6 that lasted until the 
end of the sixteenth century starts with Descartes. Indeed, Foucault cites “the first lines of 
his Regulae” as the first thoughts of a new era, namely, “the age of reason,”7 
“rationalism” and “the entry of nature, at long last, into the scientific order.”8 Foucault 
elaborates this new order with respect to Descartes’ deduction, which, in contrast to “the 
old system of similitudes” that could at best “achieve steadily increasing probability,” 
opens the new possibility of a “complete enumeration” through which we can “attain to 
perfect certainty.”9 The reduction to the simplest terms followed by certain steps of 
increasing complexity should protect knowledge precisely against a critique of excess 
and deficiency, of too much and too little, and, so, to read riddles is to read a condition of 
impossibility inscribed in the very possibility of the method itself. But not only the 
method: If Descartes marks the beginning of philosophical modernity, then that 
modernity itself is marked from its beginning by a remarkable problem: That which 
founds itself in the simple terms of certainty is riddled as soon as it attempts—and it must 
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attempt, we will see—to mark that certainty. Broadly posed through the specificity of 
Descartes, these are the stakes of the riddles that follow. 
 
To anticipate my movements, in broad strokes there will be three parts. The first sets up a 
tension threading throughout the Cartesian corpus between scholastic riddles and the use 
of words in deduction: While riddles equivocate and require excessive focus on words, 
the use of words in deduction (which cannot be avoided), by contrast, will be 
‘economized,’ which is to say disambiguated and, ideally, immaterial so as not to waste 
any undue attention (the human capacity for which, as Descartes sees it, is severely 
limited) on mere signs. The second part examines the way in which these economized 
signs are, finally, impossible according to Descartes’ own comments on words. Words 
are not only always open to plural referentiality, but they also involve materiality by 
nature, and not merely incidentally: The materiality of words plays a central role in 
establishing Descartes’ notorious mind-body dichotomy—and if material, then riddling, 
i.e. Descartes must always say too much. Finally, in the third part, I turn to the way in 
which Descartes also says too little. The point is easier to make: Words substitute for 
presence in deduction, but, of course, signs can never amount to the presence for which 
they substitute, and Descartes’ expressions, then, are always simultaneously expressions 
of a desire, which is, significantly, immoral according to the provisional moral code 
elaborated in the Discourse (I:257 ff.) and elsewhere. In sum, words are necessary, but it 
is also necessary to transcend them; Descartes needs them and needs them to disappear 
since, always too much and too little, a mark is always off the mark.  
 
To begin, riddles must be more rigorously defined, and a general look at the 
contemporary context will help. As noted already, Descartes writes that, “in the vast 
majority of issues about which the learned dispute, the problem is almost always one of 
words.” The “learned,” so often the object of Descartes’ criticism, are of course the so-
called “schools,”10 that is, scholasticism as inherited from the Middle Ages.11 The scope 
of the issue is perhaps best illustrated by the rejection of Cartesian thought by the Senate 
of the University of Utrecht in 1642, a primary cause for which being that “once [the 
young] have begun to rely on the new philosophy and its supposed solutions, they are 
unable to understand the technical terms which are commonly used in the books of 
traditional authors and in the lectures and debates of their professors.”12 As John 
Cottingham notes, “the complaint against Descartes has nothing to do with the substance 
of his doctrines, but with the fact that it does not employ the ‘technical terms used in the 
lectures and debates,’”13 an obviously shortsighted attack attempting to preserve the 
language of tradition. And if “[s]cholastic reasoning had in fact become a largely closed 
system” that consisted more in “the skilful manipulation of terminology” than “the 
pursuit of truth,” as Cottingham describes it,14 then one can understand Descartes’ 
recurrent criticism, such as in his Principles where he states that, while his own terms are 
“sufficiently self-evident,” otherwise simple notions “are only rendered more obscure by 
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logical definitions, and should not be counted as items of knowledge.”15 In short, the new 
Cartesian system is, quite literally, not on speaking terms with tradition.  
 
Against such a tradition, Descartes’ frustration with those who quibble over words or 
“merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion,”16 is perhaps justified. But 
this frustration can be refined with a closer look at scholastic riddles. Among his 
examples, Descartes cites “the riddle of the Sphinx about the animal which is four-footed 
to begin with, then two-footed, and later on becomes three-footed.”17 Discussing the 
proper approach, the method for answering such riddles, Descartes maintains that “[w]e 
must take care not to assume more than the data, and not to take the data in too narrow a 
sense.”18 For example, “there is no need to think that the word ‘footed’ refers exclusively 
to real feet – to animals’ feet”; ‘footed’ refers equally to “a baby’s hands,” an adult’s 
literal feet, and “figuratively” to “an old man’s walking-stick.”19 From this we see that 
Descartes sees riddles functioning from ambiguity, from synonymy20—an essential 
possibility that language entails since “one can always use one or several [words] to 
express the same thing”21 or, as in the case of the Sphinx, the same word to express 
several things. In short, “riddles and other enigmas ingeniously contrived to tax our 
wits”22 thrive with excess (and “excess,” we are told in the provisional moral code of the 
Discourse, is “usually bad”),23 an attempt to misguide the would-be solver into taking the 
“data” too widely (“more than”) or “in too narrow a sense.”  
 
Significantly, this riddling excess concerns not only multiple referents for a single word 
but also the word itself: “The fourth cause of error,” Descartes writes in the Principles, 
“is that we attach our concepts to words which do not precisely correspond to real 
things.”24 More specifically, “because of the use of language, we tie all our concepts to 
the words used to express them; and when we store the concepts in our memory we 
always simultaneously store the corresponding words”; however, we always “find the 
words easier to recall than the things; and because of this it is very seldom that our 
concept of a thing is so distinct that we can separate it totally from our concept of the 
words involved.”25 In other words, a word always has the potential to interfere with the 
idea to which it is ‘tied,’ which is why “[t]he thoughts of almost all people are more 
concerned with words than with things,”26 in short, with riddles—“more than the data.” 
Hence, riddles concern not only ambiguity, but also any word in excess of the thing it 
represents (which is to say any word). This concern with words is not merely a game or 
innocent pun (even the “riddle answering”27 from Oedipus suggests this, judging from 
the fate its answer incurs for Oedipus and the city of Thebes);28 it is generalizable to 
“other issues as well.”29 It complicates Descartes’ own epistemology, to which I now 
turn.  
 
Descartes’ attempt to minimize the potentially distracting effect of riddles is inseparable 
from his notion of deduction, an explication of which will also serve to underscore the 
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necessary role of words in the Cartesian method. According to Descartes, certain 
knowledge is acquired through either intuition or deduction. Intuition is neither “the 
fluctuating testimony of the senses” nor any other traditional or scholastic notion (“[f]or 
it would be very difficult for me to employ the same terminology, when my own views 
are profoundly different”); rather, it is, Descartes writes early in the Rules, “the 
conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be 
no room for doubt about what we are understanding.”30 Deduction, in turn, is “the 
inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are 
known with certainty,”31 i.e. from intuition or other propositions already deduced from 
intuition. The intuited link, then, will be the first and simplest principle from which all 
subsequent knowledge is deduced, the Archimedean point, to borrow an image from the 
Meditations.32 Descartes compares the process on several occasions to “a long chain” in 
which we can know “the last link” with as much certainty as the “first” and founding 
link, “provided we survey the links one after the other, and keep in mind that each link 
from first to last is attached to its neighbor.”33 So whether the process of deduction is 
construed, as Cottingham sees it, as “a second-best form of a cognition” that “should be 
dispensed with altogether, or at least assimilated as closely as possible to intuition,”34 or, 
as Murray Miles reads it, as merely “successive stages within the order of intuition 
itself,” a single process that Miles calls “analytic reflexion” that “consists in attending 
explicitly to what is only implicit in the mind’s intuitive certainty,”35 there remains a 
certain “wholly uninterrupted sweep of thought”36 in which one begins from the certainty 
of intuition and proceeds deductively, with equal certainty, to all things that can be 
known (or at least known to be unknowable [cf. I:28]). 
 
But Descartes clearly recognizes certain limitations to the human faculties necessary to 
perform deductions, however conceived. Although deduction in itself is infallible for 
Descartes—“none of the errors to which men…are liable is ever due to faulty 
inference”37—the human intellect’s limited scope and inability “to keep its attention on 
things without some degree of difficulty and fatigue”38 pose other problems. The long 
chains of deduction would undoubtedly be on par with intuition if we could attend to 
every necessary proposition and its relation to the next, but, since “our eyes cannot 
distinguish at one glance all the links in a very long chain,”39 Descartes asserts that 
“deduction in a sense gets its certainty from memory”:40 “If, for example,…I have come 
to know first what the relation between the magnitudes A and B is, and then between B 
and C, and between C and D, and finally between D and E, that does not entail my seeing 
what the relation is between A and E…unless I recall all of them.”41 But memory is not 
certain; it “is weak and unstable.”42 Not only too “weak” to hold reliably all the steps of a 
longer deduction, but, if one is not presently attending to a proposition, a memory can be 
imagined, as well. In the Principles, Descartes claims that when we give “our assent to 
something unclear” it is often “because we imagine that we clearly perceived it on some 
previous occasion,” and “once these things are committed to memory, we give our assent 
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to them just as we would if we had fully perceived them, whereas in reality we never 
perceived them at all.”43 Hence, memory not only threatens the intellect with inaccuracy 
and inadequacy but also with misremembering, with fabrications made possible by the 
fact that we cannot keep our present attention on plural propositions.44 
 
This leads Descartes to write that memory “must be refreshed and strengthened through 
[a] continuous and repeated movement of thought.”45 By running through the chain from 
A to E “again and again,” Descartes attempts to ensure that “memory is left with 
practically no role to play,” since he will “seem to be intuiting the whole thing at once.”46 
The whole thing at once—“the continuous and completely uninterrupted train of 
thought” must be so swift that we seem to be able “to form a distinct and, as far as 
possible, simultaneous conception of several [propositions]”; although it is a movement 
of thought, a “train,” it must be performed so quickly that the intuition of A and the 
deduction of B-E “seem to coalesce into a single operation.”47 But we are still in the 
realm of ‘seeming,’ since in moving from A to B we can only remember A, unable to 
intuit it and deduce B at the same time. So even though Descartes reassures us that “[i]n 
this way our memory is relieved, the sluggishness of our intelligence redressed, and its 
capacity in some way enlarged,”48 the problematic of deduction is nonetheless apparent: 
Absolute certainty consists in clear and distinct perception of simultaneous propositions, 
but due to the limited capacity of human nature there will always be absent propositions 
in a given deduction on which we cannot presently focus, and, hence, we are left with a 
need to both utilize and minimize memory, which is both an “asset” and “hindrance.”49 
 
Thus the role of words: To reformulate the problematic in a more explicit light, a given 
proposition (A) must remain present (“simultaneous”) while one moves to the next (B), 
even though, due to the limitations of the human intellect, by advancing one must 
abandon the previous proposition (A); that is to say, A must remain present even in its 
absence, and this is precisely the function of words: “in order to keep [multiple 
propositions] in mind or understand several together, I thought it necessary to designate 
them by the briefest possible symbols.”50 By substituting “abbreviated representations” 
for a given proposition, which will act “as adequate safeguards against lapses of 
memory,” we free “our present attention”51 to advance to other propositions or features of 
propositions; something is written or ‘symbolized’ in order to keep it present in such a 
way that it does not occupy the conscious mind. As Descartes puts it rather clearly, “we 
shall leave absolutely nothing to memory but put down on paper whatever we have to 
retain, thus allowing the imagination to devote itself freely and completely to the ideas 
immediately before it.”52 And Descartes seeks “very concise symbols” not only to 
alleviate memory more efficiently (“[i]t will thus be impossible for our memory to go 
wrong”) but also to facilitate the chain of deduction, so that “we may be able…to run 
through…with the swiftest sweep of thought and intuit as many [propositions] as possible 
at the same time.”53 
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More specifically, Descartes’ use of signs, in fact, attempts to de-riddle words. Two 
points are to be made. First, the recommended signs are to be univocal: “whatever is to be 
viewed as one thing from the point of view of the problem we shall represent by a unique 
symbol, which can be formed in any way we like.”54 Second, and more radical and 
problematic still, these symbols are to be immaterial. Armed with his concise, Adamic 
sign system, in Descartes’ own words:  
 
we shall not just be economizing with words but, and this is the important 
point, we shall also be displaying the terms of the problem in such a pure 
and naked light that, while nothing useful will be omitted, nothing 
superfluous will be included – nothing, that is, which might needlessly 
occupy our mental powers when our mind is having to take in many things 
at once.55 
 
“[N]othing superfluous”—the symbols are to be so brief, so abbreviated and concise, that 
they are only minimally existent, apparently solving the riddle of the problematically 
excessive word. This “economizing with words,” indeed, aims at eliminating the “fourth 
cause of error” mentioned earlier: Economized words cannot interfere with their 
concepts since they barely exist; they will not “needlessly occupy our mental powers,” 
and, consequently, to be “more concerned with words than with things” will become 
impossible. As Jean-Pierre Séris puts it in a different context, Descartes’ “perfect 
transparency” seeks “the pure effacement” of the word “before the very idea it 
transcribes”; “[t]he sign, giving up its chance to be seen,” Séris writes, “in fact gives us 
the idea to be seen.”56 For Descartes, who seeks to write his deductions—to borrow an 
apposite phrase from Derrida—in “white ink,”57 “[t]he horizon of the thought...is the 
elision of the sign.”58 This is, moreover, another manifestation of the discontinuity that 
Foucault marks in Descartes: In contrast to the previous era in which “signs were thought 
to have been placed upon things so that men might be able to uncover their secrets,”59 
signs now become mere “tools of analysis,”60 and language “has entered a period of 
transparency and neutrality.”61 Specifically, with the immediate transparency of the 
economized sign system, all excess will be eliminated, the data taken neither too 
narrowly (“nothing useful will be omitted”) nor too widely (“nothing superfluous will be 
included”), deduction de-riddled from both the excess of referentiality (disambiguation) 
and the excess of the sign itself (de-materialization).  
 
Before continuing, I want to stress that the risk of a riddled deduction extends even to the 
method of doubt in the Meditations, which Broughton, for instance, is careful to 
distinguish from other Cartesian approaches. In the Second Replies, Mersenne suggests 
that Descartes “set out the entire argument in geometrical fashion” so as to enable each 
reader to “see everything as it were at a single glance.”62 Mersenne recycles Descartes’ 
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own phrase here—at a single glance—which Descartes uses recurrently to describe 
deductions and their ideal simultaneity.63 “I have already followed this method,” 
Descartes replies. “The order consists simply in this,” he explains: “The items which are 
put forward first must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the 
remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely 
on what has gone before.”64 Broughton expands upon this order, and her expansion is 
nothing other than the chain of deduction that we have been considering: “a person who 
first had the thought that A, would then recognize that B, which in turn would show him 
that C. The order, A-B-C, is partly a matter of various relations among the propositions 
designated, but it is also partly a matter of the state of the person at the successive 
moments at which he entertains A, B, and C, and the ways in which the occurrence of the 
earlier states may help to bring about the later ones.”65 The “order” of the Meditations, in 
short, is a chain of deduction. As Descartes makes clear in the Search for Truth, “if you 
simply know how to make proper use of your own doubt, you can use it to deduce facts 
which are known with complete certainty.”66 Resultantly, the method of doubt in the 
Meditations does not escape the double bind of deduction: “at a glance,” says Descartes; 
“successive moments,” says Broughton. Subject to the same problematic, every order 
requires economized words, a “geometrical fashion” to subdue the risk of riddles. 
 
The parameters set, I now turn to show that Descartes’ use of signs is nonetheless 
riddling. The issue of disambiguated words is well-trodden ground and can be dealt with 
quickly in order to move to the more radical—and more interesting—issue of materiality. 
Indeed, the problem has already been broached (briefly) with the letter to Mersenne (July 
22, 1641) in which Descartes posits that “one can always use one or several [words] to 
express the same thing.”67 However, if words are arbitrary (“any way we like”), then they 
are not restrained in reference (“except by human convention”),68 and, if unrestrained, a 
sign can always refer multiply, always open to working against Descartes’ prescription of 
a “unique symbol” for “one thing.” On one hand, beginning in the seventeenth century, 
the arbitrariness of signs is celebrated. On Foucault’s account, while previous eras 
maintained a “fidelity to natural signs,” the age of Descartes, inversely, privileges the 
“conventional sign” since “it is always possible (and indeed necessary) to choose it in 
such a way that it will be simple, easy to remember,” etcetera; “the man-made sign,” says 
Foucault, “is the sign at the peak of its activity.”69 On the other hand, however, the very 
arbitrariness that allows Descartes to ‘economize’ in the first place, the radical difference 
between sign and thing, is the same arbitrariness that will open the word to multiplicity 
and excess. So, even though Descartes criticizes the equivocation of the scholastic 
tradition, intentionally or not there is always the possibility of another “thing” being 
added to a given word. But this does not seem to trouble Descartes or dissuade him from 
his project. Much more could (and should) be said on this issue, to be sure, but, for the 
sake of economy, I now turn to the less apparent (but also, materially, more apparent) 
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problem—namely, the fact that Descartes seeks immaterial words even though words as 
he recurrently describes and employs them always entail an ineffaceable materiality. 
 
To blueprint briefly the rest of this section, I will underscore language as a unique 
function of the mind-body composition. By emphasizing that words require a body no 
less than a soul, words themselves will be shown to entail materiality by their very 
nature, and, if material, then potentially riddling and immune to absolute economization. 
Further, by illustrating the operative status of Descartes’ recurrent analogy between 
sensations and words, I will be able to posit that the materiality of words in Cartesian 
philosophy plays an undeniably central role and, resultantly, cannot be ignored. To be 
seen, words matter.  
 
Language as a function of the mind-body composite is perhaps the contemporary issue of 
Cartesian scholarship on language, for language is, according to Descartes, “the only 
certain sign of thought hidden in a body,”70 the mark of the soul that distinguishes 
humans from animals. But while most focus on the relation of language to the immaterial 
soul (“no thought without language,” 71 the slogan Cottingham designates for the 
tradition), for my purposes I must focus on the materiality, the embodiment, of words. 
Descartes writes in a letter to Chanut (February 1, 1647) that “[t]he soul’s natural 
capacity for union with a body brings with it the possibility of an association between 
each of its thoughts and certain motions or conditions of this body so that when the same 
conditions recur in the body, they induce the soul to have the same thought.”72 Now, for 
my purposes, I am not so interested in how my soul, that which is “really distinct from 
my body, and can exist without it,”73 might have a “natural capacity for union” with an 
inessential body (a problem as old as Cartesian thought, first posed by Princess Elizabeth 
of Bohemia in 1643); of interest here is the fact that in the same letter Descartes’ example 
for this “association” is, in fact, words: “In the same way…, we connect the letters or the 
pronunciation of certain words, which are material things, with the meanings, which are 
thoughts.”74 The association between word and thought reflects the association between 
mind and body, and, hence, words require both the material and the immaterial to 
function, a liminality unique to humans. As Séris puts it, speech is “the most direct 
experience and the most immediate proof of the substantial union which constitutes 
[humans], insofar as it allows communication only between beings who have learned the 
meanings of words which they can understand and pronounce”:75 understand, which 
requires a soul, and pronounce, which requires a body. By implication, just as beasts are 
merely material and therefore cannot speak (“there has never been known an animal so 
perfect as to use a sign…which bore no relation to its passions”),76 a merely thinking 
thing could not speak either, since it would have no means for sensory pronunciation; in 
short, God—who has “never been in the senses,”77 who is “pure intelligence”78—is mute, 
the alleged “author”79 of existence illiterate. The mediation of words is, in effect, the 
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mediation between the mind and body, and both are necessary for what Descartes calls 
“real speech.”80 
 
The preceding considerations are necessary for a full understanding of one of Descartes’ 
recurrent analogies between words and the senses, which will shed even more light on the 
central sense of words. In brief, Descartes posits what might be called a semiotics of 
sensation, namely, the notion that our internal sensations are arbitrary signs that do not 
necessarily have any resemblance to the external objects that occasion them. If, as 
Descartes writes in one of his earliest works, The World, “we pass a feather gently over 
the lips of a child…, and he feels himself being tickled,”81 there will be nothing in the 
sensation of tickling that necessarily resembles the feather itself. This is another modern 
moment in Descartes, following Foucault, a move away from the “the age of 
resemblance” and toward “a new kinship between resemblance and illusion” in “the age 
of deceiving senses.”82 Not coincidentally, words are the model with which Descartes 
makes the move: “Now if words, which signify nothing except by human convention, 
suffice to make us think of things to which they bear no resemblance, then why could 
nature not also have established some sign which would make us have the sensation of 
light, even if the sign contained nothing in itself which is similar to this sensation?”83 
Descartes develops this analogy by pointing out that if “we hear only the sounds of some 
words, without attending to their meaning,” then the “idea of this sound” will be “very 
different” from the “object which is its cause” (i.e. the object or thought signified): “A 
man opens his mouth, moves his tongue, and breathes out,” but there is nothing in these 
“actions” that resembles the resultant concept that we would conventionally “imagine”84 
upon hearing the word. Indeed, “[m]ost philosophers maintain that sound is nothing but a 
certain vibration of air which strikes our ears” (Descartes included, cf. Principles I:282-
283), and, if words, a composite of sound and meaning, were to translate their 
materiality, they would “make us conceive the motion of the parts of the air which is then 
vibrating against our ears”85 and not the thought to which it is tied by convention. But 
this error, this indirection, makes possible communication, since, should words translate 
their material existence precisely, they would be relegated to the translation of mere 
vibrations, to the physicality of the sound rather than the syllable that the mind might 
wield. Communication is hence based upon a miscommunication, the precondition of 
words according to the logic of Descartes’ semiotics of sensation. So not only are words 
the exemplar of inaccuracy (and, therefore, already obscure their allegedly ‘transparent’ 
status in deduction), but, more importantly in the present context, words are the wedge by 
which Descartes pries a “difference”86 between sense and object of sensation. 
 
The importance of this difference is thrown into relief when recognized as a symptom of 
Descartes’ attempt to identify himself as “only a thing that thinks.”87 In other words, the 
discrepancy can be contextualized within Descartes’ valorization of the mind over the 
senses. After all, “the one thing” Descartes sets out “to prove” in the Meditations is that 
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the arguments for the existence of “the world” and “bodies” “are not as solid or as 
transparent as the arguments which lead us to knowledge of our own minds.”88 Indeed, 
on Broughton’s account, emphasis on the semiotics of sensation is the fifth and 
culminating “substantive principle” at which Descartes aims with the method of doubt: 
“although pat- terns [sic] of change in our sense experience do reflect patterns of change 
in the material things that affect us, we should not attribute to material things the qualities 
with which our sense experience directly acquaints us.”89 The symbolic understanding of 
senses in which the sensation of the thing would naturally correspond to the thing sensed 
calls for “radical skepticism” in order to “loosen the grip of the senses upon our minds.”90 
By separating sensory awareness (which is “to be identified” with “thinking”)91 from the 
object sensed (materiality or any exteriority), Descartes legibly bifurcates the mind and 
body and is therefore free to hierarchize them,92 and this is one of the reasons the concern 
with the semiotics of sensation will recur in so many major works in some capacity.93 
Therefore, insofar as the mind-body distinction plays a central role in Cartesian 
philosophy, by dwelling on the status of the linguistic analogy that buttresses that 
distinction we can establish further the pivotal role of material words in Descartes’ 
philosophy.  
 
First a qualification: One can discern, at least provisionally, two sorts of analogies for 
Descartes, the merely illustrative and the epistemic. Illustrative analogies are self-
explanatory; they do not contribute any knowledge but rather give the facts a certain 
color, merely allowing one, as Descartes says early in his career, “to philosophize in a 
more exalted way.”94 Epistemic analogies, by contrast, contribute to our understanding; 
they are necessary for deduction itself: “in all reasoning it is only by means of 
comparison that we attain an exact knowledge of the truth.”95 Specifically, as Descartes 
explains in a letter to Morin (September 12, 1638), these analogies are a comparison of 
“things that are too small to be perceived by the senses with other things that can be so 
perceived, the latter differing from the former simply as a large circle differs from a small 
one.”96 Such analogies, Descartes claims, “are the most appropriate means available to 
the human mind for laying bare the truth in problems of physics,” and he will “go so far 
as to say that, when someone makes an assertion concerning nature which cannot be 
explained by any such analogy, [he thinks he has] demonstrative knowledge that the point 
is false.”97  
 
And the analogy between words and sensation is epistemic. As Séris points out, “the 
term-by-term correspondence instituted by God between the shapes or ‘ideas’ ‘traced in 
spirits on the surface of the [pineal] gland’ [I:106] and the sensations in the mind has all 
the properties of a lexicon.”98 Indeed, sensory experience consists only in signs that we 
must read: “Is it not thus that nature has established laughter and tears, to make us read 
joy and sadness on the faces of men?”99 Moreover, sensation is “related exclusively to 
[the] combination of the human body and mind,”100 since, while the body receives the 
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external stimulus, “it is the soul which has sensory perceptions, and not the body,”101 and 
this mind-body composite, as seen, is the condition of speech as well. To reformulate the 
case more accurately in light of these considerations, words are an instantiation of the 
semiotics of sense; a material word is to the thought it engenders as a feather is to the 
sensation it creates, i.e. tickling. Hence, words help to understand the operation of the 
senses just as “a large circle” helps to understand “a small one,” to reappropriate 
Descartes’ analogy in his explanation of epistemic analogies. Not coincidentally, then, 
just as the semiotics of sensation recurs throughout the Cartesian corpus, so, too, does the 
analogy with words.102 The gravity of the materiality of words should be clear by now—
words matter. 
 
To conclude this line of thought, the point to be made here is rather simple: Descartes’ 
method opposes the matter it addresses. On one hand, Descartes needs an immaterial 
language in order to circumvent the potential riddling of the concept by the word that 
represents it; on the other hand, the materiality of words functions in Cartesian 
philosophy not only as an index of the human condition as an embodied soul but also as 
an important tool in the prioritization of the mind. Descartes’ desire for immaterial words 
is a symptom of his self-identification as a merely thinking thing, but in developing the 
discrepancy between the mind and the exterior world that would enable that self-
identification, Descartes points to material words over and over again. Many 
consequences can be drawn from this tension, to be sure. For instance, Descartes must 
use materiality in order to deduce it: His first principles of philosophy concern 
“immaterial or metaphysical things,” and from these he will “deduce very clearly the 
principles of corporeal or physical things,”103 but, insofar as deduction requires the use of 
words, and insofar as words are already corporeal, deduction relies on exteriority in 
deducing it.104 But the larger problem I am attempting to underscore is the fact that, by 
Descartes’ own standards, to say anything is always to say too much—and the method 
cannot keep silent. Along these lines, “economizing with words” is finally impossible. 
 
Now, if Descartes always says too much, he nonetheless always and necessarily says too 
little as well. To make this point, one must recall that, ideally, deduction consists in 
keeping all propositions present to a fully aware mind: Clarity, “required for mental 
intuition,”105 is that which “is present and accessible to the attentive mind – just as we 
say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye’s gaze and stimulates it 
with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility.”106 In fact, the “third cause of error” 
in the Principles is due to judgments that are not based upon such a “present 
perception.”107 Clarity and the preoccupation over presence will even be one of the 
principal concerns in the Meditations. After uncovering the cogito, Descartes admits that 
his nature “is such that so long as [he] perceive[s] something very clearly and distinctly 
[he] cannot but believe it to be true,” that is, only at the present moment, only while 
“attending to the arguments which led [him] to make it.”108 However, his “nature is also 
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such that [he] cannot fix [his] mental vision continually on the same thing, so as to keep 
perceiving it clearly,”109 thereby opening doors for error. At its best, then, deduction 
requires the immediate presence of all relevant propositions.  
 
As Descartes employs them in deduction, however, words are only a secondary pseudo-
presence, filling in for the absence of the original propositions that we cannot keep 
present. As Derrida puts it, signs are an “effort of symbolically reappropriating 
presence,”110 but they never fully amount to presence themselves. Descartes himself 
recognizes the necessary difference between sign and thing in the Optics, where he states 
that, were “an image to resemble the object it represents in all respects,” then “there 
would be no distinction between the object and its image”; the “perfection of an 
image,”111 then, lies precisely in its imperfection. Words thus function as compensation 
for what is outside our mental capacity, and the sign, whatever it represents, always 
simultaneously signals the inaccessibility of the various propositions of a given 
deduction, indexing our impotence, our desire for certainty alongside our inability to 
satisfy it. We could even speak of the Cartesian sign in terms of the logic of 
supplementarity that Derrida has outlined, since words and writing certainly supplement 
our limited mental capacities. But, as Derrida reiterates on multiple occasions, “if [the 
supplement] fills, it is as if one fills a void,” that is, it points to “the anterior default of a 
presence.”112 No number of words can re-fill what was never full, the void, the default, 
and Descartes, in always saying too much, never says enough.  
 
If I dwell on Descartes’ use of words as the expression of a desire, it is not only to show 
that he cannot say enough but also that deduction entails transgression. For Descartes, 
“the highest and most perfect moral system” is contingent upon “a complete knowledge 
of the other sciences,” but, while completing the Olympian task of a totalized body of 
knowledge, Descartes offers “an imperfect moral code which we may follow 
provisionally while we do not yet know a better one.”113 This “provisional moral code,” 
expounded in the Discourse, consists in three moral maxims, the third of which is 
relevant here: “try always to master [one]self rather than fortune, and change [one’s] 
desires rather than the order of the world.”114 Descartes holds that “nothing lies entirely 
within our power except our thoughts,” and, concerning “matters external to us, whatever 
we fail to achieve is absolutely impossible so far as we are concerned.”115 By “[m]aking a 
virtue of necessity” and considering “all external goods as equally beyond our power,” 
Descartes asserts that “we shall not regret the absence of goods which seem to be our 
birthright when we are deprived of them through no fault of our own.”116 However, 
instead of considering the propositions that we cannot keep present as “beyond our 
power,” as Descartes recurrently asserts they are, words address (better, attempt to 
redress) our limited power of concentration and memory. There is no resignation; the 
necessary but inaccessible propositions are, in effect, “absent goods” we wish were 
present.117 If, along with Descartes, “we regard each person’s contentment as the full 
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satisfaction of all his desires duly regulated by reason,”118 then Descartes—even though 
the moral code is his formula for happiness, adopted “to live as happily as [he] 
could”119—is the archetype of disgruntled philosophers. The method, then, is the path to 
sin, and philosophy, unhappiness. Words, in indexing our desire and discontent, index 
our sin and moral turpitude, as well.  
 
To conclude, Descartes was most likely aware of the double bind I have been trying to 
underscore, namely, the inevitability and the necessity of words contra the desire to 
transcend them. After all, the fourth cause of error from the Principles is listed “because 
of our use of language,” which suggests a certain acceptance of the fact that we cannot 
escape the use of words. Even the analogy between words and sensation reflects this 
acceptance, giving words consideration and even an epistemic position beyond what 
many philosophers thitherto (and thereafter) offered, beyond a tradition that often 
attempted to disavow such resources completely.120 However, that same consideration 
leads to a characterization of words that problematizes the role Descartes assigns them in 
deduction, since the mark must miss the mark, overshooting and falling short, invariably 
off the path, in error. The method, to the extent that it is constituted by words, is always 
unmethodical, always excessive and uneconomical—tainting with uncertainty, therefore, 
a certain modernity. In this sense, Descartes’ attempt to distance himself from scholastic 
equivocation, finally, is not as successful as he claims, judging by the standards he 
himself establishes. Contra his cure for riddles, any use of words forces us both “to 
assume more than the data” (words add material to the immaterial) and “to take the data 
in too narrow a sense” (words are always less than presence)—words riddle by nature.  
 
Finally, I note somewhat elliptically that if, as Descartes recurrently reiterates, words and 
“real speech” are so thoroughly tied to the unique status of humans as embodied souls, 
“the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body,”121 then the human condition itself is 
something of a riddle. I thus close where Nietzsche—who, contrary to Descartes, is 
notoriously unsystematic—begins, whose final thoughts of the preface to the second 
edition of The Gay Science provide an apposite contrast with which to conclude: While 
Descartes, from early on, sought to unmask the sciences (“[t]he sciences are at present 
masked, but if the masks were taken off, they would be revealed in all their beauty,”122 
and words, no doubt, are a cloak to be dis-mantled), Nietzsche refuses to believe “that 
truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn,” recommending that we “respect…the 
bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties,” a 
respect that, not coincidentally, includes believing in “forms, tones, words, in the whole 
Olympus of appearance.”123  
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1 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II, 
trans. John Cottingham et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 270. In accordance with 
recent standards, hereafter I will include the volume and page number of this series of translations of 
Descartes’ works. Though many works are published in a single volume, I will treat each title within a 
given volume as a distinct work for the sake of clarity in citations. I use the following abbreviations: Rules, 
Discourse, Principles, Passions, and Meditations. 
 
2 Janet Broughton, Descartes’s Method of Doubt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 4-5. The 
method of doubt, Broughton argues, “has no strategic role to play unless there is an incompatibility 
between very well entrenched beliefs of ours and other claims that somehow emerge as absolutely certain” 
(52). The method of doubt, she says, “is supposed to produce a lasting change in the limited set of our 
fundamental beliefs” (7), radically correcting that incompatibility. The Meditations are not my primary 
focus, but as the occasion arises I will point out the necessity of deduction even in doubt. 
 
3 René Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 
I, trans. John Cottingham et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 17. I note in passing the 
difficulty with the ‘innateness’ of the method: That which is innate is to be intuited, but intuition is already 
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the first step of the method (more on which in subsequent pages). In other words, intuition cannot be 
properly conducted without a method (“[w]e need a method if we are to investigate the truth of things” 
[Rules I:15]), but the method itself must be intuited. Hence, the method must remain in reserve, 
unactivated, without a method to the method—except by chance, which is exactly the way in which 
Descartes claims to have “happened” upon it in the Discourse on the Method: “I consider myself very 
fortunate to have happened upon certain paths…” (I:112). Necessarily by chance, even though “it is far 
better never to contemplate investigating the truth about any matter than to do so without a method” (Rules 
I:16). As my focus here will be primarily on deduction rather than intuition, however, this is a question for 
another occasion. 
 
4 Ibid., 53-54. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 17. 
 
7 Ibid., 51. 
 
8 Ibid., 54. In The Order of Things, of course, Descartes “remained as close as possible to what constituted 
Classical thought” (247). But, certainly, we see ourselves in the scientific order, even if Foucault marks 
another discontinuity at the beginning of the nineteenth century that inaugurates the modern age. Moreover, 
“the organization of signs” after Descartes, which will concern me throughout this paper, has continued, 
Foucault says, “perhaps right up to our own day” (58). Indeed, Foucault seems to have readjusted 
Descartes’ ‘Classical’ position by the time of the 1981-82 lectures on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 
where he claims that “the history of truth enters its modern period” at the “Cartesian moment,” that is, 
“when it is assumed that what gives access to truth…is knowledge…and knowledge alone.” In other words, 
truth becomes intuitable and deducible without, which is Foucault’s point there, “spirituality.” Michel 
Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador 
2001), 17. 
 
9 Foucault, The Order of Things, 55. 
 
10 E.g., Descartes, Discourse, I:142. 
 
11 In Cottingham’s summary, “a complex fusion of…the philosophical doctrines of Aristotle and…the 
demands of Christian theology.” John Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Reference, 1993), 153. 
 
12 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume III, The Correspondence, trans. John 
Cottingham et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 393 n.1. Admittedly, this particular 
dispute did not involve Descartes himself but his disciple, Henri de Roy (Henricus Regius), whom 
Descartes would ultimately be forced to renounce (cf. Comments on a certain Broadsheet and the preface 
to Principles [I:189]), but, nevertheless, the accusations are against “the new philosophy,” i.e. the Cartesian 
system itself and not any individual adherent. 
 
13 John Cottingham, Descartes (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 5. 
 
14 Ibid., 6. 
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15 Descartes, Principles, I:195. 
 
16 Descartes, Meditations, 8.  
 
17 Descartes, Rules, I:53. 
 
18  Ibid., I:54. 
 
19 Ibid., I:55. 
 
20 Descartes seems to follow Aristotle here, inasmuch as Aristotle defines “a riddle” as “describ[ing] a fact 
in an impossible combination of words,” which, he adds parenthetically, “cannot be done with the real 
names for things.” That is to say, the proper name de-riddles language. Aristotle, Poetics, in The Rhetoric 
and the Poetics of Aristotle, trans. Ingram Bywater (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1984), 1458a25-30. 
 
21 Descartes, Correspondence, III:187. 
 
22 Descartes, Rules, I:54. 
 
23 Descartes, Discourse, I:123. 
 
24 Descartes, Principles, I:220. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, in Sophocles I, ed. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, trans. David 
Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 29 (line 440). 
 
28 “Wisdom, the myth seems to whisper to us,…is an unnatural abomination.” Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48. 
 
29 Descartes, Rules, I:54. 
 
30 Ibid., I:14. 
 
31 Ibid., I:15. 
 
32 “Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immoveable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I 
too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and 
unshakeable.” Descartes, Meditations, II:16. 
 
33 Descartes, Rules, 15. 
 
34 Cottingham,  A Descartes Dictionary, 46. 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:1                                                                                                       Cross | 25 
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